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In Search of the Black Swan: Analysis of
the Statistical Evidence of Electoral
Fraud in Venezuela
Ricardo Hausmann and Roberto Rigobon
Abstract. This study analyzes diverse hypotheses of electronic fraud in the Recall
Referendum celebrated in Venezuela on August 15, 2004. We define fraud as the dif-
ference between the elector’s intent, and the official vote tally. Our null hypothesis is
that there was no fraud, and we attempt to search for evidence that will allow us to
reject this hypothesis. We find no evidence that fraud was committed by applying nu-
merical maximums to machines in some precincts. Equally, we discard any hypothesis
that implies altering some machines and not others, at each electoral precinct, because
the variation patterns between machines at each precinct are normal. However, the
statistical evidence is compatible with the occurrence of fraud that has affected every
machine in a single precinct, but differentially more in some precincts than others. We
find that the deviation pattern between precincts, based on the relationship between
the signatures collected to request the referendum in November 2003 (the so-called,
Reafirmazo), and the YES votes on August 15, is positive and significantly correlated
with the deviation pattern in the relationship between exit polls and votes in those
same precincts. In other words, those precincts in which, according to the number of
signatures, there are an unusually low number of YES votes (i.e., votes to impeach
the president), is also where, according to the exit polls, the same thing occurs. Using
statistical techniques, we discard the fact that this is due to spurious errors in the data
or to random coefficients in such relationships. We interpret that it is because both
the signatures and the exit polls are imperfect measurements of the elector’s intent
but not of the possible fraud, and therefore what causes its correlation is precisely the
presence of fraud. Moreover, we find that the sample used in the audit conducted on
August 18 was neither random nor representative of the entire universe of precincts.
In this sample, the Reafirmazo signatures are associated with 10 percent more votes
than in the non-audited precincts. We built 1,000 random samples in non-audited
precincts and found that this result occurs with a frequency lower than 1 percent.
This result is compatible with the hypothesis that the sample for the audit was chosen
only among those precincts whose results had not been altered.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This study presents a statistical evaluation of the
results of the August 15, 2004 Recall Referendum on
President Hugo Cha´vez’s mandate. From the morn-
ing of August 16, 2004, when the CNE (Consejo Na-
cional Electoral) announced the results, opposition
spokespersons expressed doubts about the validity
of these results, and argued that an electronic fraud
had been committed. These doubts had not been
cleared up with the passing of time.
At the time, Su´mate—a Venezuelan NGO that
had organized the collection of signatures to request
the referendum and monitored its execution—reques-
ted that we do a statistical analysis to verify if the
available information is compatible with the hypoth-
esis of fraud or if, on the contrary, it rejects this
hypothesis. Su´mate provided the data used in this
study but gave us complete autonomy over the con-
duct of our research.
We were informed that the presumption of fraud
is based on the following elements:
(1) The adoption of a new automated voting sys-
tem in spite of the fact that the opposition had re-
quested a manual tally.
(2) The voting machines left a paper trail by print-
ing ballots that allowed each elector to verify that
the machine had counted his vote adequately. These
ballots were collected in boxes. However, the CNE
did not allow the boxes to be opened and counted.
Instead, it performed a so-called “hot” audit of 1
percent of the machines on the evening of the elec-
tion. Moreover, the CNE decided that the number
of boxes to be opened would be chosen by a random
number generator program run on its own computer.
(3) After a difficult negotiation, the CNE allowed
the Organization of American States and the Carter
Center to participate as observers in every phase of
the process except for access to the central computer
server that communicated with each machine in each
voting precinct. No witness from the opposition was
granted access to that room either. Only two peo-
ple were allowed in that room until the results were
ready.
(4) The adopted technology allowed—in fact re-
quired—bidirectional communication between the
central servers and the voting machines. This bidi-
rectional communication occurred. This is different
from the information that was provided to opposi-
tion negotiators about the nature of the technology
involved.
(5) Contrary to what was initially stipulated, the
voting machines communicated with the central ser-
ver before printing the results in a document called
Acta. This opens the possibility that the machines
were instructed to print a result different from the
one expressed by the voters.
(6) On August 15, 2004, different organizations,
including Su´mate, conducted exit polls in a num-
ber of precincts. To assure its quality, Su´mate’s poll
was conducted with the assistance of the firm Penn,
Shoen and Berland. Its results were radically differ-
ent from official figures. The same thing occurred
with the exit poll conducted by “Primero Justicia,”
a political party. The database of both surveys was
given to us to conduct this study.
(7) The “hot-audit” conducted at dawn on Au-
gust 16, 2004 was not carried out to the satisfac-
tion of either the opposition or the international ob-
servers. Only 78 of the 192 boxes stipulated were
counted. The opposition only attended 28 counts,
and the international observers were only present in
less than 20.
(8) As requested by the international observers,
a second audit was conducted on August 18. The
opposition did not participate in this audit because
its conditions were not met; for example, the elec-
toral materials were not delivered to a centralized
location before choosing the boxes to be opened and
there was no verification that the boxes selected had
not been tampered with. Instead, the boxes were
chosen 24 hours before they were opened, which in
theory would give time for them to be altered. No-
tably, the CNE did not use the random number gen-
erator program proposed by the Carter Center, and
instead insisted on using its own program run on its
own computer and started with a seed defined by
a pro-government member of the CNE. This raises
doubts over whether the sample selected was truly
a random one, or that the sample was unknown be-
fore the voting started.
All these facts raise the possibility of an electronic
fraud in which the machines printed outcomes dif-
ferent from the real count. This could in theory have
been done through software alterations, or through
electronic communications with the computer hub.
Our main findings are the following. First, the pa-
per finds that the sample used for the audit of Au-
gust 18, which was observed by the OAS and the
Carter Center, was not randomly chosen. In that
sample, the relationship between the votes obtained
by the opposition on August 15 and the signatures
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gathered requesting the Referendum in November
2003 was 10 percent higher than in the rest of the
boxes. We calculate the probability of this taking
place by pure chance at less than 1 percent. In fact,
we create 1,000 samples of non-audited precincts to
prove this.
This result opens the possibility that the fraud
was committed only in a subset of the 4,580 au-
tomated precincts, say 3,000, and that the audit
was successful because it directed the search to the
1,580 unaltered precincts. This sheds new light on
the fact that the Electoral Council did not accept
the use of the random number generator proposed
by the Carter Center and under these conditions
one can infer why the Carter Center could not iden-
tify the fraud with the audit they observed. In other
words, before the voting process starts the random
seed might be known, and therefore, the computer
only changes the machines that ex-ante knows that
have no chance of being audited. The machines au-
dited look like a random sample regarding regions,
social characteristics, etc. except for the fact that
they were not affected by the fraud.
In addition, we develop a statistical technique to
identify whether there are signs of fraud in the data.
To do so, we depart from previous work on the sub-
ject that was based on finding patterns in the num-
ber of votes per machine or precinct. Instead, we
look for two independent variables that are imper-
fect correlates of the intention of voters. Fraud is
nothing other than a deviation between the voters’
intention and the actual count. Since each variable
used is correlated with the intention, but not with
the fraud, we can develop a test as to whether fraud
is present. In other words, each of our two indepen-
dent measures of the intention to vote predicts the
actual number of votes imperfectly. If there is no
fraud, the errors these two measures generate would
not be correlated, as they each would make mis-
takes for different reasons. However, if there is fraud,
the variables would make larger mistakes where the
fraud was bigger and hence the errors would be pos-
itively correlated. The paper shows these errors to
be highly correlated and the probability that this is
pure chance is again less than 1 percent.
The first variable we use is the number of reg-
istered voters in each precinct that signed the re-
call petition in November, 2003. This clearly shows
intent to vote yes in a future election but it does
so imperfectly. Our second measure is the exit poll
conducted by Penn, Schoen and Berland and com-
plemented with an independent exit poll conducted
by Primero Justicia. This is also an imperfect mea-
sure as it depends on potential biases in the sam-
ple, differences in the skill of the interviewer, etc.
But this source of error should not be correlated
at the precinct level with the one that affects the
signatures. Therefore, it is very telling that in the
precincts where the Penn, Schoen and Berland exit
poll makes bigger mistakes is also where the number
of petitioners suggests that the Yes votes would be
higher.
This evidence is troubling because it resonates
with three facts about the conduct of the election.
First of all, contrary to the agreed procedure, the
voting machines were ordered to communicate with
the election computer server before printing the re-
sults. Second, contrary to what had been stated pub-
licly, the technology utilized to connect the machines
with the computer hub allowed two-way communi-
cation and this communication actually took place.
This raises the possibility that the hub could have
informed the machines what numbers to print, in-
stead of the other way around. Finally, after an ar-
duous negotiation, the Electoral Council allowed the
OAS and the Carter Center to observe all aspects of
the election process except for the central computer
hub, a place where they also prohibited the presence
of any witnesses from the opposition. At the time,
this appeared to be an insignificant detail. Now it
looks much more meaningful.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we
describe the evidence coming from the exit polls. We
show that the difference between the exit polls and
the actual vote is not likely to have been caused
by a sampling error, due for example, to an over-
representation of anti-Chavez precincts, but instead
to a generalized but variable difference, precinct by
precinct.
Second, we discuss some of the previous evidence
of fraud and its validity. We address the popular
so-called “topes” hypothesis. According to this the-
ory, machines were ordered not to surpass a certain
maximum number of Yes votes. If this was the case,
there should be an unusually large number of re-
peated Yes totals in each precinct and the repeated
number should also be the maximum Yes vote total
in the precinct. We show that the frequency with
which the repeated number is also the maximum
Yes vote of the precinct is consistent with a random
event—which means that it does not constitute ev-
idence of fraud in our view. We then move on to
study whether the variance of results at the precinct
level is unusual. This would be the case if some but
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Table 1
Comparison between electoral results and Su´mate’s and Primero Justicia’s exit polls
Unweighted Weighted
Percentage of YES votes at the precinct level 37.0% 41.1%
Percentage of YES in Su´mate’s exit poll 59.5% 62.0%
Percentage of YES votes where Su´mate did their exit poll 42.9% 45.0%
Percentage of YES in PJ’s exit poll 62.6% 61.6%
Percentage of YES votes where PJ did their exit poll 42.9% 42.7%
Percentage of YES in Su´mate +PJ exit polls 61.3% 62.2%
Percentage of YES votes where Su´mate +PJ did their
exit polls 43.1% 44.2%
not all machines were manipulated at the precinct
level. We find the variance at the precinct level to be
if anything smaller than would be expected by pure
chance. Again, we do not find evidence of fraud in
this dimension. In the end, the objective of this sec-
tion is to take a balanced view to the discovery of
fraud.
The next section develops our test for fraud us-
ing our two independent but correlated measures of
voters’ intent. We then move on to test whether the
sample used for the audit of August 18 was random.
The final section concludes.
2. DISCUSSION ON THE EARLIER
EVIDENCE OF FRAUD
2.1 Exit Polls Versus Votes: Analysis of the
Differences
The first evidence of potential irregularities in the
election count derives from the exit polls conducted
independently by Su´mate and Primero Justicia (PJ).
As shown in Table 1, according to the CNE, 41.1
percent of voters voted YES to impeach the presi-
dent. On the other hand, in the Su´mate and PJ sur-
veys, the weighted projections were 62.0 and 61.6
percent, respectively, a difference of more than 20
points.
We check whether this difference is due to the fact
that the sample chosen by Su´mate and Primero Jus-
ticia was not representative of the electoral universe.
In other words, we check whether the problem arises
because of an over-representation of precincts in fa-
vor of the YES vote in relation to those in favor of
the NO. We show that this is not the source of the
problem. As shown in Table 1, according to the CNE
the percentage obtained by the YES in the precincts
surveyed by Su´mate was 45.0 percent, while in PJ’s
sample the result was 42.7 percent. In other words,
Fig. 1. Exit polls versus electoral result: percentage of the
YES by precinct.
in the sample chosen by both organizations, the re-
sult reported by them differs from the official tally
by more than 17 percentage points. Hence, the dif-
ference in the results is not principally due to the
sample composition but to a systematic difference
across the sample where the exit polls were con-
ducted.
To illustrate this problem more clearly, in Figure 1
we show the percentage of votes and the survey re-
sults for the 340 precincts surveyed by both groups.
If the surveys were perfect, the points would align in
a ray from the origin with a 45 degree slope (drawn
in the graph). In other words, where the YES op-
tion received respectively 10 percent, 50 percent or
80 percent, the surveys would show the same result.
If the points in the graph are above the 45 degree
line, it means that the poll overestimates the result
in that precinct. If the points are below, the poll
underestimates it.
As can be seen, the bulk of the 342 precincts polled
are above the 45 degree line. Moreover, the graph
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indicates that the differences between the votes and
the surveys are very variable among precincts. The
distances to the 45 degree line are largest in places
where the YES option garnered between 20 and 40
percent.
This analysis has the following implications. First,
it indicates that the difference between the surveys
and the votes is not due, in any important way, to
problems in the selection of the precincts to be in-
cluded in the survey. Second, the analysis implies
that the difference may be due to one of the two
reasons, or to a combination of both. It may be
due to a generalized failure in both surveys in each
precinct, or to a quite generalized and nonlinear
manipulation of the results. It will be a challenge
of the statistical work to distinguish between these
two hypotheses and investigate which is the right
one.
2.2 The Caps or “Topes” Hypothesis
The fraud hypothesis most discussed in Venezuela
has been based on the idea that numerical caps were
imposed on the amount of YES votes that could
be allowed in a precinct and that the overflow of
YES votes would be switched into NO votes. In this
section we evaluate this hypothesis.
To analyze the feasibility of this hypothesis we
examine how many times the number of YES and
NO votes are repeated at the precinct level in the
CNE’s database, which contains 19,062 automated
machines (see Table 2).
The repetition of the YES count occurs with a fre-
quency of 9.8 percent while that of the NO occurs
with a frequency of 7.7 percent. We do not test
whether this frequency is unusually high or low.1
However, the relatively high frequency is at least in
part due to the fact that the number of electors as
well as the voting percentage tends to be very simi-
lar among machines in the same precinct. The fact
that the repeated YES totals occur with a slightly
higher frequency than the NO is at least in part
due to the fact that YES has a lower percentage of
votes. Let us illustrate this point with an example.
Suppose the preference for the YES vote in a single
precinct is approximately 40 percent and the num-
ber of voters at each machine is 100. A 5 percent
variation would imply 2 votes, so the expected re-
sult in each machine could be between 38 and 42.
The result could be in some of the five numbers in-
1 Jonathan Taylor from Stanford University has argued
that it is unusually high. See http://www-stat.stanford.
edu/~jtaylo/venezuela/.
Table 2
Number of YES and NO total votes per machine that are
repeated in the same precinct
Variable Number of machines Numbers repeated Frequency
Si 19,062 1,875 9.8
No 19,062 1,472 7.7
Table 3
Maximum and non-maximum numbers repeated per voting
tome at the precincts
Machines per precinct Non-maximum Maximum Total
2 0 64 64
3 58 66 124
4 161 80 241
5 144 54 198
6 230 46 276
7 221 46 267
8 197 14 211
9 151 4 155
10 97 8 105
11 85 2 87
12 52 2 54
13 36 0 36
14 18 0 18
15 20 0 20
16 7 0 7
17 6 0 6
18 6 0 6
Total 1,489 386 1,875
cluded in that interval. On the contrary, the same
percent variation for the NO would yield a variation
between 57 and 63 votes, which gives seven possible
numbers. Since the amount of possible numbers is
higher for the NO than for the Yes, it is logical the
latter would repeat less frequently.
More importantly, the cap hypothesis implies that
the number that repeats itself is also the maximum
from the precinct and that the difference is assigned
to the NO. For this, it is necessary that the re-
peated number also be the maximum YES vote in
the precinct. We study this hypothesis in Table 3.
The table includes all precincts in which repeated
numbers are observed and classifies them by the
number of voting machines in the precinct. Column
one shows the number of machines per precinct. Col-
umn 2 shows the number of repeated numbers that
are not the maximum of the precinct, as required
by the theory. The third column shows the number
of repeats that are the maximum, while the final
column adds the two.
6 R. HAUSMANN AND R. RIGOBON
If the repeated number was randomly distributed,
it would occur with a frequency equal to 1/(Number
of machines – 1). For example, in the case of pre-
cincts with two machines, the repeated number is
simultaneously the maximum and the minimum, for
there is only one number. In the case of three ma-
chines, the probability that the repeated number is
the maximum is 50 percent.
As we see in Table 3, 66 is not very far from being
half of 124. In the case of five machines, 54 is not
far from being one-fourth of 198. We conclude that
if there was fraud, this was not done through the
imposition of numerical caps to the YES votes in
the machines of a precinct.
2.3 Variance Analysis of the Within-Precinct
Results
The caps hypothesis, if true, would also affect the
percentage difference in the results of the machines
belonging to the same precinct. This is due to the
fact that the amount of voters per machine varies
due to differences in the abstention rate or in the
number of electors assigned to each machine. This
variation would show in the number of NO votes,
and therefore would create a source of variation in
the results across machines of the same precinct.
This hypothesis and any other hypothesis that is
based on the idea of altering some machine more
than others at the precinct level can be tested.
In each precinct, voters are distributed to ma-
chines according to the last two digits in their iden-
tity card number (ce´dula de identidad). This al-
lows each machine to be a random sample of the
precinct’s voters because the last digits in their iden-
tity card are not correlated with any variable rele-
vant to the voting decision. This limits the possi-
ble distance between the results from two machines
from the same precinct. To illustrate this, consider
how opinion surveys are done in any country. A ran-
dom sample is chosen—usually of a thousand or two
thousand people—and the outcome is used to pre-
dict the results of millions of voters. In other words,
a representative sample composed of a miniscule
fraction of the electorate is used to predict the out-
come of the whole. In the case of a precinct we are
taking a much smaller and homogeneous universe
than a country and we are dividing the population
randomly according to the number of machines in
the precinct. For example, in the case of a precinct
with five machines, each machine represents approx-
imately 20 percent of the total population of the
precinct. In addition, in the case of this referendum,
the options were limited to two: YES or NO. This
imposes a condition for the standard deviation of
the number of votes per machine. Suppose that in a
machine, there were N votes cast and the probabil-
ity that each vote is a YES is p. Then, the number
of YES votes is a binomial random variable with
expectation Np and with standard deviation equal
to
√
p(1− p)N . To illustrate this, take the case in
which p is the probability that an elector will vote
YES in a given precinct, is equal to 50 percent andN
is 400. In this case, the standard deviation would be
10 votes. The coefficient of variation (or the stan-
dard deviation of the percentage vote) would be 10
divided by 400, meaning, 2.5 percent. Given this,
the typical deviation among machines in the same
precinct must be compatible with this rule. If, for
example, within a precinct the results of some ma-
chines were changed by 10 percent while the others
were left unaltered, then we would see an increase
in the deviation among all machines that would be
four times the expected standard deviation of 2.5
percent. This would be abnormal.
One implication of this result is that the caps or
“topes” theory would also violate the expected dis-
tribution of a binomial. If numerical caps were as-
signed to each machine in a precinct, the variation
of the number of voters per machine would affect
the number of NO votes and therefore alter the per-
centage results in a manner that would increase the
dispersion of the results and cause these to violate
the binomial rule.
To verify if the CNE vote data comply with the
standard deviation predicted by probability theory,
we calculate each machine’s deviation with respect
to the average of its precinct. Moreover, we divide
this number by the standard deviation that would
correspond to a precinct with the actual number of
voters and machines. Figure 2 presents our results.
It shows a histogram of the percent difference among
machines of the same precinct with respect to the
standard deviation expected by the binomial distri-
bution. The curve reflects the expected theoretical
distribution. The bars are the frequency calculated
with the actual data. As can be seen, the coincidence
is quite substantial. The graph indicates that only
close to 1 percent of the machines have deviations
higher than two times the expected standard devia-
tion. This frequency is consistent with the theoreti-
cal distribution. In fact, if there is anything surpris-
ing about the graph, it is that the deviations of the
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Fig. 2. Distribution of the deviation of results of machines
relative to the precinct mean relative to the predicted standard
deviation.
results are if anything too small, as can be seen by
the large concentration of results near zero variation.
This result has two possible interpretations. One
is that there was no fraud. The other is that if fraud
was committed, it must have been done by chang-
ing every machine in the precinct by a similar per-
centage. In fact, a fraud of this kind would not be
detected with the analysis done so far for it would
not alter the variance results among machines. Any
hypothesis of fraud that does not comply with this
condition would violate the restriction imposed on
the deviation of the results by the binomial distri-
bution.
3. A STATISTICAL STRATEGY TO DETECT
THE PRESENCE OF FRAUD
To detect if the data are compatible with the pres-
ence of fraud we need to develop a model and fit it to
the data. We define fraud as the difference between
the voters’ intent and what the electoral system reg-
istered about their decision. We will take as our null
hypothesis the assumption that there was no fraud.
We will then develop a test to see if the null hypoth-
esis can be rejected.
The main challenge is that we cannot observe the
voters’ intent directly. The statistical strategy we
adopted begins with finding two sets of independent
variables that are correlated to the voters’ intent,
but not with the fraud. For our purposes, it is not
too important that our variables do not predict the
voters’ intent perfectly. Even if they do so imper-
fectly, it may still give us a chance to reject the
hypothesis of no fraud. Notice that the worse the
quality of the data, the harder it will be to reject
the null hypothesis, meaning that bad information
makes it harder, not easier, to reject the hypothesis
of no fraud.
To illustrate what we do, we start with a simplified
presentation of our approach. In practice, things are
a bit more complicated, but explaining the sources
of complexity will be easier after the fundamental
intuition is presented.
Let us take two variables that are correlated to the
elector’s intent: the number of signatures in favor of
holding a recall referendum that were collected dur-
ing the December 2003 (called Reafirmazo) drive
and the proportion of YES responses in the exit
polls. We use si and ei to denote the number of
signatures and the number of YES responses in the
exit poll in the ith precinct, respectively. Each one
of these variables is an imperfect measure of the
voters’ intent on August 15, 2004. The Reafirmazo
was a public vote. Signatures were observed and
identities known. The motivations to sign are dif-
ferent than voting YES in the referendum. For in-
stance, some people that signed the petition may
have changed their opinion in the intervening months.
Others might have decided not to sign because it was
not secret, but may have decided to vote later given
its secrecy. Others may not have been registered in
November and hence could not sign, but were regis-
tered by August and hence could vote. The lines in
the August election were particularly long and slow
and that may have reduced the number of voters,
etc.
Equally, exit polls are an imperfect measure of
the voter’s intent. Pollsters may have, consciously
or unconsciously, gathered a biased sample. People
may have had more or less willingness to cooperate
with the interview, etc. However, these errors are of
a quite different nature from the errors generated by
the relationship between signatures and votes and
hence should not be correlated.
Suppose we have an imperfect measure of the vot-
ers’ intent in each precinct and we build a graph
relating this variable—say the signatures—and the
voters’ intent. As the signatures are an imperfect
measure of the voters’ intent, the graph will look
like a cloud of dots around some basic relationship
(Figure 3).2 Regression analysis can identify the line
that relates the signature with the voters’ intent.
2 This graph was built with simulated data using a ran-
dom number generator. The data were created supposing that
each signature generates 0.7 votes with an error normally dis-
tributed between +0.1 and −0.1.
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Fig. 3. Simulated relationship between signatures and vot-
ers’ intent.
Fig. 4. Simulated ratio between signatures and votes with
fraud proportional to 30 percent of the YES votes.
The real relationship is 0.7, because that is how we
built the data. The estimated relationship using the
simulated data is 0.71+ /− 0.014, as is indicated by
the graph.
We cannot observe the voters’ actual intent but
can only see the votes registered, and these, in the-
ory, could be influenced by fraud. Suppose fraud
takes place and it is directly proportional to the
numbers of votes in that precinct. For example, let
us suppose that fraud is committed by multiplying
the total number of YES votes in a machine by 0.7
and the difference added to the NO votes.
Figure 4 illustrates this case. In this case, the esti-
mated slope is no longer 0.7 but 0.5. In addition, the
pattern of errors—that is to say, the distance with
respect to the regression line—looks similar. It re-
veals no evidence of fraud. If fraud were committed
this way, we would be unable to detect it. In fact,
Fig. 5. Nonproportional fraud.
a fraud that reduces a fixed percentage of YES votes
across all machines would practically be impossible
to detect by purely statistical methods without ad-
ditional information; that is, it could only be de-
tected using another source of information such as
counting the paper ballots.
Now, suppose the fraud was not committed in
a proportional manner. For example, suppose it was
committed in some precincts and not in others. Spe-
cifically, suppose fraud consists of eliminating 30
percent of the YES votes in precincts where signa-
tures were less than 30 percent or more than 70 per-
cent of the registered voters. In this case, the pattern
of errors will have a peculiar shape, as shown in Fig-
ure 5. This peculiarity is not due to the imperfect
nature of the number of signatures as predictor of
votes, but is caused by the presence of fraud.
What happens if we now use a second measure
of the voters’ intended vote, for example the exit
polls? This is also an imperfect measure of the vot-
ers’ intended vote and as such when doing a re-
gression analysis, this will generate errors. Never-
theless, if there is a nonproportional fraud, this will
also generate an irregularity in the errors which will
look similar, that is, will be correlated with the er-
rors in the other relationship. A positive and sig-
nificant correlation would identify nonproportional
fraud.
Note that each measure—the one based on sig-
natures and the one based on exit polls—is imper-
fect. Nevertheless, what makes each of them imper-
fect are factors different and independent from each
other. The exit poll is not influenced by the turnout
rate, as people are interviewed after they vote. The
signatures do not depend on the ability or bias of the
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interviewer. People could have changed their minds
between November and August, but people do not
change their minds for the same reason between the
act of voting and the exit interview. Signing is a pub-
lic act and voting is secret, etc. Therefore, errors
made by each measure may be larger or smaller but
they should not be correlated. However, if there is
nonproportional fraud, it will influence each of these
measures in the same way. Hence, the errors made
by both should be positively correlated. This is the
essence of the method we used.
4. INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE APPROACH
4.1 Theoretical Considerations
In this section we derive formally the technique
we use. In particular, we show that for a variety of
increasingly complex assumptions about the nature
of the fraud the covariance between the errors of the
instrumental variables regression is an appropriate
test of the absence of fraud.3
Assume that the fraud is defined as the difference
between the votes for Si actually collected and an
unobservable variable that is the intention of voting
of the voters that showed up. We define the first one
as νi, the intention of voters as χi, and the fraud
as φi:
νi + χi = φi,(1)
where i indexes precinct. As discussed earlier, two
additional measures of the intention of voters are
the number of YES responses in the exit poll in the
precinct (ei) and the number of signatures collected
in the precinct (si). These measures, however, are
imperfect but can be modeled as
ei = αχi + εi,(2)
si = βχi + ηi,(3)
where we are assuming that the exit polls are possi-
bly a biased estimate of the intention to vote: α can
be smaller than 1. The signatures (si’s), as well,
could be a biased measure. Both equations have an
error (εi and ηi) that takes into account the fact that
both the exit polls and the signatures are very im-
perfect measures of the voter’s intentions—even the
biased measured intentions. We assume that these
3See Hausman [5] and Green [4] for an introduction to in-
strumental variables. The original contribution of Instrumen-
tal Variables is from Wright [8].
errors are uncorrelated among themselves and with
the fraud.4
How can we detect fraud? Fraud can only affect
the actual votes, not the exit polls, nor the signa-
tures. In other words, fraud is a displacement of
the distribution of votes that is not present in the
other two measures. Statistically, this means that
fraud could be detected by using the exit polls and
the signatures as predictors of the voting process
and analyzing the correlation structure of the resid-
uals. Under the assumption that all residuals are
uncorrelated—which makes sense given the defini-
tions we have adopted—then the correlation of resid-
uals is an indication of the magnitude of fraud.
The particular procedure used to detect fraud is
the following:
(1) Estimate the regression of νi on ei plus con-
trols and recover the residual. This residual has two
components: the fraud and the errors in variables
residual due to the fact that the exit polls are noisy.
(2) Estimate the regression of νi on si plus con-
trols and recover the residual. This residual has two
components: the fraud and the errors in variables
residual due to the fact that the signatures are an
imperfect measure of the intention of voters.
Notice that these two residuals are correlated: first,
because both have fraud as an unobservable compo-
nent, and second, because the right-side variables
are correlated and there are errors in variables in
the regression.
(3) Estimate the regression of νi on ei plus con-
trols using si as an instrument. Recover the residual.
Notice that in our model, because ηi is uncorrelated
with εi and φi, we can use si as an instrument to
correct for the error in variables.
(4) Using the same logic, estimate νi on si plus
controls, and using ei as the instrument. Recover the
residual. In this case, because the two coefficients
are supposed to have solved the problem of error
in variables the residuals can only be correlated if
there is a common component—which in our case is
the definition of fraud.
This procedure actually detects how important
fraud is. The next section first explains why this
procedure indeed is able to identify fraud. After that
we also analyze the possibility that fraud is corre-
4This is a reasonable assumption considering that the sig-
natures were collected at different times and conditions than
the exit polls.
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lated with signatures—which is likely given what we
have argued about the stochastic properties of the
votes per machine and precinct. Finally, we present
evidence.
4.2 OLS Estimation (No Correlation Between
Fraud and Intention to Vote)
Solving for χi in (2),
χi =
1
α
ei −
1
α
εi,(4)
substituting in (1) we find
νi = θei + ζ1,i,(5)
where
ζ1,i = φi −
1
α
εi.
For this model, the estimate of the slope coefficient,
θ, by OLS is given by
θols =
αvar(χi)
α2 var(χi) + var(εi)
(6)
which is always smaller than 1/α—the true coeffi-
cient. This means that the residual from the regres-
sion (ζ1,i) is
ζ1,i = φi +
(
1
α
− θols
)
ei −
1
α
εi.(7)
We can proceed in the same manner but now consid-
ering si as opposed to ei. We solve for the intention
of voting in equation (3). The slope coefficient is
piols =
β var(χi)
β2 var(χi) + var(ηi)
(8)
which is always smaller than 1
β
. The residual is given
by
ζ2,i = φi +
(
1
β
− piols
)
si −
1
β
ηi.(9)
Notice that the two residuals are correlated. Under
the assumption that εi and ηi are uncorrelated, and
also uncorrelated with fraud, there are two compo-
nents that create the correlation among these resid-
uals: fraud, and the errors-in-variable bias:
cov(ζ1,i, ζ2,i) = var(φi)
+
(
1
α
− θols
)(
1
β
− piols
)
cov(ei, si).
The first term is the variance coming from fraud,
while the second term comes from the variance due
to the error in variables that is present in both ei
and si. Notice that we are assuming that the errors
in variables are independent. The covariance arises
because the error in variables downward biases both
coefficients (θols <
1
α
and piols <
1
β
) and because the
exit polls and the signatures are correlated through
the voter’s intention.
4.3 Instrumental Variables
Under our assumptions, we have an easy solution
to the error in variables in both regressions. Notice
that ηi and εi are uncorrelated and that ηi is un-
correlated with φi. Additionally, ei and si are cor-
related because both measure the same factor (χi).
This means that si can be used for instrumenting ei
and ei for instrumenting si. The outcome is as fol-
lows:
νi = θei + φi − εi.(10)
The IV estimate is
θiv =
cov(sivi)
cov(siei)
,
θiv =
β var(χi)
αβ var(χi)
,
θiv =
1
α
,
which means that the residual is
ζ1,i = φi −
1
α
εi.(11)
Notice that now the errors-in-variables component
has disappeared. Similarly, if we run the regression
for votes on signatures and using the exit polls as
instrument, we find:
νi = pisi + φi −
1
β
ηi.(12)
The IV estimate is
piiv =
cov(eivi)
cov(eiei)
,
piiv =
var(χi)
β var(χi)
,
piiv =
1
β
,
which means that the residual is
ζ2,i = φi −
1
β
ηi.(13)
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The correlation between the residuals of the two IV
regression is now
cov(ζ1,i, ζ2,i) = var(φi).(14)
So, a simple test is to compare these two covariances,
and determine if they are statistically different from
zero. Furthermore, if the covariance of the IV resid-
uals is different from zero, then we have an estimate
of the importance of the fraud.5
4.4 Estimation When There is Correlation
Between Fraud and Intention to Vote
The previous exercise has assumed that fraud is
uncorrelated with the signatures as a measure of the
intent to vote, but as we have argued in the previ-
ous section, this is unlikely. In fact, most probably,
fraud is correlated with the signatures because the
government used that information in the design of
the fraud. Let us repeat the previous exercise al-
lowing for any covariance structure between fraud
and the signatures. We assume that the number of
votes in each precinct is νi = χi + φi + ρsi, where ρ
is the coefficient capturing the correlation between
the fraud and the signatures.
The residual from running OLS of votes on exit
polls is
ζ1,i = φi +
(
1
α
− θols
)
ei −
1
α
εi + ρsi,(15)
while the residual of running votes on signatures is
ζ2,i = φi +
(
1
β
− piols + ρ
)
si −
1
β
ηi.(16)
Equations (15) and (16) are equivalent to equa-
tions (7) and (9). Notice that the two residuals are
correlated as before, but now there are two addi-
tional terms:
cov(ζ1,i, ζ2,i)
= var(φi) +
(
1
α
− θols
)(
1
β
− piols
)
cov(ei, si)
+
(
1
α
− θols
)
ρ cov(ei, si) + ρ
2 var(si).
That arises from the correlation between fraud and
the signatures.
On the other hand, the residual of the IV regres-
sion when votes are projected on the exit poll and
5 This procedure is in the spirit of the recent literature on
identification through heteroskedasticity (Rigobon [6]). The
classical reference on identification is Fisher [3].
signatures are used as instruments is
ζ1,i = φi −
1
α
εi + ρsi +
(
1
α
− θiv
)
ei,(17)
while the residual of projecting votes on signatures
and using the exit polls as instruments is
ζ2,i = φi −
1
β
ηi + ρsi.(18)
One point worth noticing is that when exit polls
are used as instruments, the results are identical to
those in the previous subsection. In other words,
whether fraud is correlated or not with the signa-
tures, makes no difference in the validity and qual-
ity of exit polls as instruments. The fraud is not
correlated with the exit polls or their innovations.
Signatures, on the other hand, are correlated with
fraud. This makes exit polls a good instrument for
signatures, but signatures are not a good instrument
for exit polls.
Let us compare the two covariances: the covari-
ance for the OLS residuals with the covariance for
the IV residuals. The OLS residuals have covariance
equal to
cov(ζ1,i, ζ2,i)
OLS
= var(φi) +
(
1
α
− θols
)(
1
β
− piols
)
cov(ei, si)(19)
+
(
1
α
− θols
)
ρ cov(ei, si) + ρ
2 var(si)
while the covariance for the IV estimates is
cov(ζ1,i, ζ2,i)
IV
= var(φi) + ρ
(
1
α
− θiv
)
cov(ei, si)(20)
+ ρ2 var(si).
First, notice that as before, if there is no fraud the
covariance of the IV residuals should be zero. Fur-
thermore, the covariance in equation (2) reflects the
different forms of fraud. The first element (var(φi))
is the component when fraud is random, while the
last two terms capture fraud when it is correlated
with the signatures.
Second, the difference between the two covariances
is
covOLS− covIV
=
(
1
α
− θols
)(
1
β
− piols
)
cov(ei, si)(21)
+ (θiv − θols)
∗ρ cov(ei, si),
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where the two terms are easily signed. We know
that the error in variables, together with a nega-
tive ρ, implies that both OLS estimates are down-
ward biased. We also know that a reasonable set of
assumptions imply that signatures and exit polls are
positively correlated. Hence, the first term is a mul-
tiplication of three positive elements. Additionally,
we know that θiv is closer to
1
α
than θols. This means
that the term in brackets is negative, and we have
been analyzing only the case in which ρ is nega-
tive. Hence, the covariance of the OLS residuals has
to be larger than the covariance of the IV residu-
als. Notice that if ρ were positive we could not have
made this claim. And there would be circumstances
in which the covariance actually goes up after in-
strumenting.
4.5 Results
In this section we estimate the covariance of the
residuals from the OLS and instrumental variables.
Our results are summarized as follows: first, we ob-
serve a reduction in the covariance, as would be con-
sistent with the presence of ρ being negative (i.e.,
against the YES vote). Second, we find that covIV
is positive and statistically significant, which is in-
formative of the fact that ρ is significantly different
from zero and there is fraud.
It is important to remember that in this procedure
we are allowing the exit polls and the signatures to
be imperfect measures of the actual votes. Not only
do we allow them to be noisy, but we also allow them
to be biased. So, our results will NOT depend on the
fact that the mean of the exit polls is different from
the mean of the votes.
For the estimation, we included other explanatory
variables in our analysis. These are: (i) the number
of new voters in each precinct from the time the
signatures were collected; and (ii) the turnout rate
in each precinct.
The new voters were unable to take part in the
Reafirmazo as they had not been previously regis-
tered to vote. The more new voters there are, the
greater the number of votes there should be. Now
then, the percentage of YES votes could increase
or diminish according to the difference in political
preferences of the new voters with respect to those
registered previously. As in the previous case, the
turnout rate obviously increases the number of votes
and is able to do so in a differentiated manner be-
tween the YES and NO options.
The estimated equation is (all variables in logs):
νi = c0 + c1si + c2 newvotei
(22)
+ c3 turnouti+εi,
where νi is the logarithm of the number of YES
votes; si is the logarithm of the number of signa-
tures in each precinct; newvotei is the percentage
of new voters; turnouti is the percentage of voters
participating; and c0, c1, c2 and c3 are parameters
to be estimated. Table 4 shows the results of our
estimates for the 342 (voting) precincts for which
we also have exit polls, using the most conventional
method: the squared minimums.
The estimate allows us to explain 97 percent of
the variation in votes among (voting) precincts. It
estimates parameters c0, c1, c2 and c3 with great
precision. Specifically, c0 is the constant, estimated
at 0.306. Parameter c1 is the elasticity between sig-
natures and votes and is estimated at almost 1 (in
reality it is 0.994). This implies that if a precinct
has twice as many signatures as another, it obtains
on average twice as many votes. Parameter c2 is the
elasticity of the YES votes to variations in the per-
centage of new voters. It is estimated at 0.46, which
means that if the number of voters in a precinct
increases by 100 percent, the YES votes would in-
crease by 46 percent. Parameter c3 is the elasticity
of the number of YES votes compared to a change in
the voters participating and is estimated at 0.306,
which indicates that a 10 percent increase in the
rate of voters participating would cause a 3.06 per-
cent increase in the number of YES votes.
This equation does not indicate the actual ratio
between the voters’ intended vote and its explana-
tory variables, but between the latter and the votes
published. As in Figure 4, the possible presence of
fraud influences the estimated coefficients, biasing
the slopes downward, and in part is found in the
error term.
The second equation we estimated was the ra-
tio between votes and exit polls also for the 342
precincts for which we have data. The equation we
estimated is similar to equation (22) but now using
the exit polls (ei) as the proxy for voters’ intentions:
νi = c0 + c1ei + c2 newvotei
(23)
+ c3 turnouti+εi,
where ei is the number of YES votes which the poll
for this precinct predicts given the number of voters
ANALYSIS OF THE STATISTICAL EVIDENCE OF ELECTORAL FRAUD IN VENEZUELA 13
Table 4
Estimate of the equation between votes and signatures, new voters and voters participating
Source SS df MS
Model 185.800888 3 61.9336295
Residual 5.84296339 338 0.017286874
Total 191.643852 341 0.56200543
Number of obs = 342
F (3,338) = 3582.70
Prob>F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.9695
Adj R-squared = 0.9692
Root MSE = 0.13148
νi Coef. Std. err. t P > |t| [95% Conf. interval]
ei 0.9942821 0.0099034 100.40 0.000 0.974802 1.013762
newvotei 0.4604462 0.0375 12.28 0.000 0.3866834 0.5342089
turnouti 0.3311808 0.0813913 4.07 0.000 0.1710835 0.4912781
cons 0.3059669 0.0782436 3.91 0.000 0.1520611 0.4598727
that actually showed up to vote and the percentage
of YES votes documented in the poll. The results
appear in Table 5.
Again, the equation explains a large part of the
variance of the logarithm of votes (82%). The esti-
mated elasticity of the voting intentions according
to the polls is 0.97. These estimates could also be bi-
ased downward by the presence of fraud, but we are
mostly interested in understanding what the impli-
cations are regarding the correlation of the residuals.
Table 5
Estimate of the relationship between votes and the exit polls
Source SS df MS
Model 157.862978 3 52.6209927
Residual 33.7808737 338 0.099943413
Total 191.643852 341 0.56200543
Number of obs = 342
F (3,338) = 526.51
Prob>F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.8237
Adj R-squared = 0.8222
Root MSE = 0.31614
νi Coef. Std. err. t P > |t| [95% Conf. interval]
ei 0.9701892 0.025357 38.26 0.000 0.9203118 1.020067
newvotei −0.6612884 0.0868377 −7.62 0.000 −0.8320987 −0.490478
turnouti 0.4244489 0.1957766 2.17 0.031 0.0393549 0.8095429
c0 0.0722736 0.2086177 0.35 0.729 −0.3380789 0.4826261
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Table 6
Analysis of the relationship between the errors in the
equations using minimum squares
Covariance 9.3× 10−3
Covariance typical deviation 2.8× 10−3
T-Student on the covariance 4.1
Probability different from zero 0.999
Correlation 0.24
In Table 6 we present the covariances, their dif-
ferences and their significance. The correlation is
24%, which is surprisingly high. This does not per-
mit us to reject the fraud hypothesis. In other words,
in places where the signatures are proportionally
wrong in the sense of predicting more YES votes
than those obtained, the exit polls also overestimate
the YES votes. Since both measurements are inde-
pendent, the implication is that what they have in
common is fraud.
This is the first result consistent with the fraud
hypothesis. Formally, we can say that we cannot re-
ject the hypothesis that fraud was committed. The
presence of this correlation indicates that there is
something in common between the errors commit-
ted by the exit poll and the errors committed by the
signatures and this is consistent with a difference
between the elector’s voting intent and the official
tally.
However, it is possible to argue that the observed
correlation might be generated by two sources. One
is the fact that our measurements of the voter’s in-
tent are very noisy or imperfect and that the errors
in such variables might generate problems. The sec-
ond is that we suppose fixed coefficients between sig-
natures and votes or between exit polls and votes,
and that these coefficients might be random. This
opens the possibility that the correlation we are find-
ing may have been generated by other factors and
not by fraud.
To discard this possibility we estimate using the
IV strategy. Table 7 shows the same equation as Ta-
ble 4, but this time it uses the instrumental variables
method where the exit polls is the instrument.
Note that the coefficient of the signatures now in-
creases: from 0.994 in the estimate in Table 4 to
1,013 in Table 7. This is normal, as the existence of
errors or noise in the data tends to lower the coef-
ficients estimated with the method of Table 4. On
cleaning or lowering the problem of errors in the
data, higher coefficients are usually obtained.
Table 7
Regression between votes and signatures using exit polls as an instrumental variable
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression
Source SS df MS
Model 185.741458 3 61.9138192
Residual 5.90239422 338 0.017462705
Total 191.643852 341 0.56200543
Number of obs = 342
F (3,338) = 3013.34
Prob>F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.9692
Adj R-squared = 0.9689
Root MSE = 0.13215
νi Coef. Std. err. t P > |t| [95% Conf. interval]
si 0.9701892 0.025357 38.26 0.000 0.9203118 1.020067
newvotei −0.6612884 0.0868377 −7.62 0.000 −0.8320987 −0.490478
turnouti 0.4244489 0.1957766 2.17 0.031 0.0393549 0.8095429
c0 0.0722736 0.2086177 0.35 0.729 −0.3380789 0.4826261
Instrumented: si
Instruments: newvotei turnouti ei
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Table 8
Regression between the votes and exit polls using signatures as an instrumental variable
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression
Source SS df MS
Model 151.228444 3 50.4094815
Residual 40.4154074 338 0.119572211
Total 191.643852 341 0.56200543
Number of obs = 342
F (3,338) = 517.96
Prob>F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.7891
Adj R-squared = 0.7872
Root MSE = 0.34579
νi Coef. Std. err. t P > |t| [95% Conf. interval]
ei 1.176787 0.030827 38.17 0.000 1.11615 1.23742
newvotei −0.6829967 0.0949936 −7.19 0.000 −0.8698498 −0.4961437
turnouti 0.1627794 0.2148175 0.76 0.449 −0.2597683 0.5853271
c0 −1.523351 0.250735 −6.08 0.000 −2.016549 −1.03015
Instrumented: ei
Instruments: newvotei turnouti si
Table 8 re-estimates the same equation as in Ta-
ble 5 but using instrumental variables. This time,
the coefficient of the exit poll (ei) increases from
0.97 to 1.17. This is to be expected as the data of
the exit polls, given their nature, are noisier than
the signature data, which is why the method in Ta-
ble 5 skews the coefficient more than in the case of
the signatures.
On studying the relationship between the errors in
these two equations, we obtain the data presented
in Table 9. The analysis shows that even after using
the method of instrumental variables to correct for
problems of errors in variables, the correlation be-
tween errors generated using signatures and those
generated using exit polls diminishes only from 0.24
to 0.17 and remains significantly different from zero.
Table 9 summarizes our two main results: First,
the correlation of the residuals in the OLS and in the
IV strategies is statistically different from zero. Sec-
ond, the OLS covariance and correlation are larger
than in the IV. This means that we reject the hy-
pothesis that there was no fraud, and we reject the
hypothesis that fraud was random.
Our strategy has consisted in utilizing two sources
of information related to the voters’ intended vote
but not to the possible fraud. If we use these sources
or variables in estimating the votes imperfectly, then
the residual will contain not only the imperfections
of our sources but also a component associated with
fraud. Our interpretation is that since the imper-
fections are independent from each other and the
residuals are correlated, there must be a common
factor tying them together, that is, fraud.
4.6 The Audit
Any hypothesis of fraud requires an explanation
of why the audits that took place did not find any
foul play. While the first audit carried out in the
wee hours of the morning of August 16 failed, the
audit conducted on August 18, if it was well car-
ried out, should have settled the issue. The audit
was based on opening 150 randomly selected bal-
lot boxes, which contain the original paper ballots
checked by the voters and which thus reflect their
real intended vote. If these boxes were not tampered
with and if they really are a random sampling of
the universe of precincts, the audit should rule out
any presumption of fraud. So, how could fraud have
taken place, if the audit did not find it? It should
be pointed out that any hypothesis of fraud which
involves changing hundreds of ballot boxes would
constitute a conspiracy involving a large number of
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Table 9
Analysis of the relationship between errors in the two equations used
to estimate the number of votes: minimum squares versus
instrumental variables
Item Minimum squares Instrumental variables
method method
Covariance 9.3× 10−3 7.7× 10−3
Typical distortion 2.8× 10−3 2.5× 10−3
Probability different from zero 0.999 0.991
Correlation 0.24 0.17
T-Student of covariance 4.1 3.1
participants and hence would be more likely to be
revealed through disloyalty.
One hypothesis is that fraud was not committed
in all precincts but only in a fraction of them. To
give an example, suppose that out of the 4,580 auto-
mated precincts used in the election, 3,000 precincts
were altered but the rest were not. Let us further
suppose that the unaltered 1,580 precincts were
picked at random. This implies that they would rep-
resent a balanced sample of the country from a re-
gional and social point of view. The same would be
true of the 3,000 precincts in which the results sup-
posedly had been altered. One reason to do things
this way is that it was known (beforehand) that ex-
post audits would be carried out and that a num-
ber of precincts would be checked. To accommodate
this, they would have to be unaffected by fraud.
Note that if fraud is committed in some precincts
and not in others, then it will not be perfectly pro-
portional and the method used in the previous sec-
tion would detect it. If the selection of the precincts
left unaffected was done in this way, this creates an
important complication but also opens up a great
opportunity. The complication is that the selection
of the boxes to be audited could not really be ran-
dom ex-post. It is critical that the selection be made
among the 1,580 untampered precincts and not
among the 3,000 tampered ones. This is only possi-
ble if one has control over the random number gen-
erator that selects the boxes to be audited. In this
sense, it has to be pointed out that the National
Electoral Council refused to make use of the ran-
dom numbers-generating program proposed by the
Carter Center and insisted on the use of their own
program installed in their own computer—which was
the one counting the votes and connecting to the
electronic machines.
The opportunity generated by this form of ad-
dressing the audit problem is that any sample taken
of the 1,580 untampered precincts is a representa-
tive sample of the country in the social and regional
sense. This makes it more difficult to know if the
sample taken was really random, as it resembles the
country in all the dimensions usually associated with
representativeness, such as regional or social.
To solve this problem we must develop a method-
ology that allows us to test if the sample taken for
the audit on August 18th really is a random sam-
ple. To understand the problem more clearly, let us
call the tampered precincts “fat” and the untam-
pered ones “thin.” The sample taken for the audit
must be a sample of only “thin” precincts, while
the rest of the precincts are a mixture of “fat” and
“thin.” If we could “weigh” the audited precincts, we
would be able to see that on average the un-audited
precincts are “fatter.” The problem is that we need
to develop a methodology that can test whether the
audited precincts weigh as much as the others do
or whether on the contrary they have a statistically
different body frame.
The method we suggest is as follows. There ex-
ists a theorem in statistics that states that if a ratio
applies to an entire unit, any random sampling of
the same must have the exhibit ratio. If we estimate
the ratio of the universe of un-audited precincts and
estimate another for the audited ones, the second
cannot be statistically different from the first. Oth-
erwise, it would not be a random and representative
sample.
To implement this strategy we again made use of
our model that correlates signatures, voter partici-
pation rates and new voters with the number of ac-
tual votes cast. In this case, because we are not
going to use the exit polls in the analysis we can
use the data from all precincts. We estimated this
ratio based on the universe of 4,580 precincts and
we looked at the obtained coefficients. We then esti-
mated them separately between the audited precincts
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and the un-audited ones and determined if the co-
efficients are statistically different.
To see if the results are different and to calculate
the statistical significance of the difference, it is use-
ful to estimate the equations in the following way:
Votes = c0 + c1 (vector of explanatory
explaining variables)
+ c2 dumi (vector of explanatory
explaining variables),
where c0, c1 and c2 are parameters to be estimated
and dumi is a “dummy” variable worth 1 if we are
dealing with audited precincts and 0 if we are deal-
ing with un-audited ones. The boxes belong to the
same random distribution if the parameters c are
not different from zero. The explanatory variables
utilized are the number of signatures, the number of
voters registered in the REP (Permanent Election
Register) at the time of the Reafirmazo (petition re-
signature collection drive), the number of new voters
registered after the Reafirmazo and the number of
voters who did not vote. We estimated the equation
in logarithms.
The results are very clear, as is indicated in Ta-
ble 10. The interaction term dumi∗Signatures shows
that the elasticity of the signatures to votes is 10.5
percent higher in the audited precincts than in the
un-audited ones, that is, the signatures collected
in the audited precincts on August 18th generate
10.5 percent more YES votes than the rest of the
precincts. The statistical value of Student’s t is 2.73.
The probability that this is by chance is less than 1
percent (shown with the three asterisks in the ta-
ble). The coefficient on new voters is also different
with a level of confidence of 1 percent whereas the
coefficient with regard to the abstaining voters is
different with a level of confidence of 10 percent.
To illustrate what is unusual with this result we
constructed 1,000 random samples of 200 precincts
based on the universe of un-audited precincts. We
estimated the same equation and calculated the sta-
tistical value of Student’s t for the term dumi ∗
Signatures. The result is shown in Table 11. As the
table shows, a value of said statistic higher than 2.48
occurs less than 1 percent of the time. In the sam-
ple of the audit on August 18, this value is 2.73.
We conclude that the data indicate that the au-
dited precincts are statistically different from the
un-audited precincts. This implies that they do not
form a random sample of the entire universe of pre-
cincts (audited and un-audited). In the audited pre-
Table 10
Do the audited precincts represent the (entire) universe of
precincts? Robust t statistics in parentheses * significant at
10 %; ** 5 %; *** 1 %
Log SI
si 0.958
(129.46)***
dumi ∗ si 0.105
(2.73)***
Log Electores Reafirmazo 0.043
(4.89)***
dumi ∗ Log Electores Reafirmazo −0.126
(3.06)***
Log Electores Nuevos 0.595
(23.64)***
dumi ∗ Log Electores Nuevos 0.118
(1.30)
Log Electores no votantes −0.459
(11.47)***
dumi ∗ Log Electores no votantes 0.312
(1.89)*
dumi∗ 0.171
(1.51)
Constant 0.254
(9.14)***
Observations 4,580
R-squared 0.97
cincts, the signatures are transformed into a larger
number of votes than in all of the precincts (au-
dited and un-audited) taken together. The proba-
bility that this occurs by coincidence is less than 1
percent. This result tends to confirm the doubts ex-
pressed as regards the reliability of the audit.
4.7 Intuition
In this section, we would like to illustrate both our
theory of fraud, as well as how we test for it.
Assume that in Florida half the precincts are Re-
publican and half Democratic. How do we know
this? Well, first we have the results of the previous
presidential election in each precinct, which should
be a good predictor of today’s preferences, and we
also know how many Republicans and Democrats
are registered in each precinct. Obviously, these mea-
sures are not perfect, and they are possibly biased,
but they should be related. Also assume that on
election day there are exit polls. Assume that these
polls are extremely noisy and biased.
Assume that fraud is going to be committed—in
favor of the Republicans (just an example). How can
we have a perfect fraud? In the absence of an audit,
electronic fraud is simple—when the machines con-
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Table 11
Frequency distribution of the statistic of Student’s t value on
the parameter of signatures in 1,000 regressions estimated on
the basis of 1,000 samples randomly taken from the
un-audited precincts universe
Percentiles Smallest
1% −2.60853 −3.342794
5% −1.832646 −3.233441
10% −1.425525 −3.053542
25% −0.8046502 −3.053519
50% −0.0189599
Largest
75% 0.7440667 3.232639
90% 1.360018 3.658616
95% 1.770322 3.975739
99% 2.48632 4.010863
Obs = 100
Sum of Wgt. = 100
Mean = −0.019166
Std. Dev. = 1.104314
Variance = 1.21950
Skewness = 0.074719
Kurtosis = 3.04989
nect to the central computer, the central computer
sends a program that makes the machine to report
10 percent fewer Democratic votes, and 10 percent
more Republican votes. This does not change the
total number of voters but changes the proportion.
This is undetectable, statistically speaking. The
exit poll and the party registration data will show
that there is a change in votes in favor of the Repub-
licans. The exit polls will give a different answer, but
in the end, because the exit polls are so noisy, the
blame will be given to the imperfection in the col-
lection of the polls rather than use them as evidence
of fraud.
The only deterrent to fraud in this case is to have
an audit, and the question is how we can achieve
a kind of fraud that survives the audit. Assume that
the machines leave a paper trail of each vote and
some of the machines will be audited.
Here is a fraud strategy that would be undetectable
using standard statistical methods. Assume that the
election is really evenly divided between Republi-
can and Democratic precincts but that half of the
precincts are tampered with. Let us say that 10 per-
cent of the votes will be shifted. The tampered re-
sult of the election will now show that 3
4
of the cen-
ters will have voted Republican and only 1
4
would
have gone for the Democrats. Now, to pass the au-
dit, the machines that will be checked cannot belong
to the set of tampered machines. This is why it is
important to be able to control the choice of the ma-
chines to be audited. Therefore, to make the fraud
pass the audit the authority draws random numbers
that have 3
4
weights in the Republican precincts and
1
4
in the Democratic ones. Assume this is done in
the morning of the election, so the authority knows
in advance which precincts to leave unaffected by
fraud. In the end, the audit is passed, 3
4
are Repub-
lican and 1
4
are Democrat.
This simple procedure—which only requires ob-
serving the results of previous elections, or in the
Venezuelan case, to observe the number of signa-
tures and compare them to the universe of voters—
will hide fraud from an audit if the precincts are
not chosen in a truly random fashion. Here, the
exit polls would give a different result, but again,
most of the discrepancy would be blamed on the
exit polls.
Two properties worth emphasizing are satisfied
by these data. First, the mean of the audited sam-
ple and that of the whole sample would be similar.
Second, the correlation between votes and the prior
information is the same in the two samples. This,
at a first glance, could look as if this is evidence
of no fraud, but that is incorrect. Remember that
the correlation between two variables is unaffected if
one of the variables is multiplied by a positive num-
ber. Hence, the correlation between the signatures
and the votes in the Venezuelan case is exactly the
same as the correlation between the signatures and
90 percent of the votes. So, a fraud of, say, 10 percent
would not affect the correlation between signatures
and fraud. It would, however, affect the coefficient,
which is what we check for.
Therefore, how can we detect fraud? In the au-
dited sample, the information that existed before—
the estimates of voter preference—is a better pre-
dictor of the actual votes than in the non-audited
sample. For example, in the audited sample, if the
precinct was Democratic in the past, it has a high
likelihood of being Democratic today. But in the
non-audited sample, the problem is that this rela-
tionship is weaker. In other words, we can detect
if the conditional behavior between the two sam-
ples is different, and therefore, argue that something
strange is happening in the data. This is the second
test we run.
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The first test is one in which we compare the pre-
dicted error of the votes using the two different mea-
sures of the preferences of voting. For example, the
reasons why the exit poll is an imperfect measure of
voter preference are different from the reasons that
make the previous election a bad measure. For in-
stance, one is affected by the turnout rate, while the
other one is not; one took place several months be-
fore the other one; one is collected by the electoral
committee and the other is collected by the private
sector—which could possibly have a vested interest
in a particular outcome, etc. The important aspect
of our test is that the reasons why one of the mea-
sures is imperfect are different from the reasons why
the other one also is imperfect. On the other hand,
if there is fraud, then both measures have a common
reason why they fail. This is our first test.
5. CARTER CENTER CRITIQUE
The Carter Center issued a report entitled “Re-
port on an Analysis of the Representativeness of the
Second Audit Sample, and the Correlation between
Petition Signers and the Yes Vote in the Aug. 15,
2004 Presidential Recall Referendum in Venezuela”
which is a response to our paper “In search of the
black swan: Analysis of the Statistical Evidence of
Electoral Fraud in Venezuela.” In preparing their re-
sponse, the Carter Center never contacted us to ask
questions about our methodology or asked to see our
data in order to reproduce our results, although we
offered to do so.
One important aspect of our paper is that we stud-
ied whether the sample used by the Carter Center
for the purpose of the audit was a random sample
of the whole universe of automated voting precincts.
We also present what we believe to be evidence of
fraud, but the Carter Center report does not deal
with this aspect of our report. They are mainly con-
cerned with the randomness of their subsample.
How does the Carter Center answer our claim?
They make three propositions:
(1) They check whether the means of the votes in
the two samples are similar.
(2) They check whether the correlation between
signatures and votes is similar in the audited and in
the non-audited precincts.
(3) They test the random number generator pro-
gram used by the Electoral Council and find that it
does generate a random draw of all the precincts.
They also correctly point out that the numbers are
not truly random in the sense that the same initial
seed number generates the same sequence of num-
bers.
5.1 Similar Sample Means
With respect to the first point, the question that
the Carter Center asks is whether the unconditional
means of the two samples are similar. By uncondi-
tional we mean that they do not control for the fact
that precincts are different in the four dimensions
we include in our equation or in any other dimen-
sion.
To see the importance of conditioning, let us imag-
ine that there is fraud and let us suppose that the
fraud is carried out in a large number of precincts
but not in all of them. The question is: is it possible
to choose an audit sample of non-tampered centers
that has the same mean as the universe of tampered
and un-tampered precincts? The answer is obviously
yes. Let us give an example using a population with
a varying level of income, say from US$ 4,000 per
year to several million. Assume that half of them
have been taxed 20 percent of their income while
the other half have not. Is it possible to construct
an audit sample of non-taxed individuals whose av-
erage income is similar to that of those that have
been taxed? Obviously the answer is yes. However,
if one controls for the level of education, the years of
work experience and the positions they hold in the
companies they work in, it should be possible to find
that the audited individuals actually had a higher
net income than the non-audited group. That is the
essence of what we do.
Now, let us go back to the case in point. Precincts
vary from those where the YES got more than 90
percent of the vote to those where it got less than
10 percent. This is a very large variation relative to
the potential size of the fraud, say 10 or 20 percent.
It is perfectly feasible to choose a sample that has
the same mean as the rest of the universe.
However, the non-random nature of the sample
would be revealed if we compare the means but con-
trol for the fact that each precinct is different. That
is what we do and this is the randomness test that
the audited sample failed.
5.2 Similar Correlation Coefficients
The second check consists of comparing the corre-
lation between signatures and votes in the two sam-
ples, which they find to be very similar. But a simple
correlation is not a test of causality or strength.
To see this, suppose that in the audited sample
there is a perfect relationship in which each signa-
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ture becomes 2 votes, and in the non-audited sam-
ple, because of fraud, the relationship implies that
each signature becomes only 1 vote. The correla-
tion coefficient in both samples is 1. This is due to
the fact that the correlation coefficient is affected
by whether the two variables move up and down
together, but not by whether they do so in a rela-
tionship of 1-to-1, 2-to-1 or 10-to-1. This procedure
is certainly no proof of randomness or of the absence
of fraud.
5.3 Test of the Sample Number Generator
The final point is that the random number genera-
tor actually generates a sample that can potentially
pick all the universe of precincts and that it was
tested and appeared to actually generate random
numbers. However, there are many ways in which
this kind of analysis is weak. The most obvious one
is that the program does not really generate ran-
dom numbers but a predetermined set of numbers
for each seed-number that initiates the sequence. By
putting a known seed-number the Electoral Council
would know beforehand which precincts would come
up, and could thus decide which precincts to leave
unaltered. It is our understanding that in the audit
conducted on August 18–20, the seed number was
provided by the Electoral Council and implemented
in their computer. It does not matter if, as reported
by the Carter Center, after 1,000 draws, the likeli-
hood of any precinct being chosen looks reasonably
random. The point is that the first draw is com-
pletely predetermined by the seed number.
5.4 Response
The Carter Center report does not address the two
main findings of our report. It completely disregards
the evidence we put forth regarding the statistical
evidence for the existence of fraud in the statistical
record. It only addresses the issues we raise regard-
ing the randomness of the sample used for the audit
they observed on August 18–20, 2004. They show
that the unconditional means between the audited
sample and the rest of the universe are similar. How-
ever, this is no proof of randomness. Conditional on
the characteristics of the precincts, we show them
to be different and this result is not challenged or
addressed by the report. The report also argues that
the correlation coefficient between signatures and
votes in the audited sample is similar to that in the
rest of the precincts, but this is an irrelevant statis-
tic for this discussion. Finally, the report checks the
source code of the software used but leaves open
wide avenues for fraudulent behavior.6
6. CONCLUSIONS
This report rejects certain hypotheses about fraud
in the Venezuelan referendum of August 15, 2004,
but not others. We did not find empirical validity
for the much-discussed hypothesis of numerical caps.
We were also unable to prove any hypothesis that
implies differentially tampering with the (voting)
machines of the same precinct. A manipulation of
this kind would alter the percentile differences in
such a way as to violate the expected variance at
the precinct, and would have been detected by this
analysis. All hypotheses of fraud must presuppose a
similar tampering in all the machines of a precinct.
If this had been done in a homogeneous manner in
all of the country’s precincts, none of the methods
applied in this study—as well as other statistical
methods—would have been able to identify it. What
allows us to develop a test of the possible existence
of fraud is precisely the heterogeneous treatment of
the different precincts. To carry out this test we used
two imperfect, random and independent indicators
of the intent to vote. Our definition of fraud consists
of the existence of a difference between the voters’
intended vote and the votes registered by the CNE.
Our two indicators, as imperfect as they might be,
are correlated with the intended vote of the elector,
but not with the tampering. If both are used inde-
pendently in regressions to estimate the relationship
between them and the vote count, the error term
or deviation will reflect not only the imperfection of
the instrument applied but also the fraud. If both
deviations are correlated, it shows there is a common
element of deviation in both. This element is our ev-
idence of fraud. Furthermore, to be consistent with
the hypothesis of fraud, this correlation has to be
positive; that is, in those precincts where fraud was
larger, both measures would project more votes than
were actually registered. This is precisely what we
find. Our two indicators are the number of registered
voters in each precinct who signed in the Reafirmazo
6We do not know what happened during the audit, as we
were not present. We do know that the sample fails the ran-
domness test we designed. The Carter Center has nothing to
say about this fact. Paraphrasing Popper again, the Carter
Center seems content in finding the odd white swan here and
there. That does not prove the proposition that the sample
was randomly chosen. We have presented a formal test of ran-
domness and the sample fails it. That is a black swan.
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of November 2003, and the exit polls held by Su´mate
and Primero Justicia on August 15th, day of the
Recall Referendum. The result holds if we control
for the changes in the electoral register and the ab-
stention rate. Furthermore, the result holds up well
to changes in the functional form of the ratio (lin-
ear, logarithmic, percentile). The result is not due
to spurious statistical effects (errors in the variables
or the possible presence of random coefficients), as
they hold up when we correct for these factors using
estimators based on instrumental variables.
We note that this technique identifies fraud in-
sofar as it is carried differentially across precincts.
It allows us to test for the presence of fraud, but
it does not allow us to estimate its magnitude as
the average fraud will be reflected in the parame-
ters of the relationships we estimate while the dif-
ferential fraud will be reflected in the error terms.
We use the error terms in the identification of fraud,
not the estimated parameters. Again, any hypothe-
sis of fraud must presuppose that the results of all
the machines in the same precinct were tampered
with proportionally. This requires some coordina-
tion mechanism. In theory, this coordination could
be in the software or in the communication with the
central computer hub. For these reasons, it is useful
to point out the following precedents:
• The machines had the capacity to communicate
bidirectionally with the central computer server
or hub and this communication took place.
• The machines communicated with the hub before
printing the Certificates, which opens the possi-
bility that they were instructed to print results
different from the real ones.
• The entrance of witnesses from the opposition or
of the international observers to the computer hub
during election day was not allowed.
The voting system implanted in Venezuela gener-
ates voting ballots that are checked by the voter
and placed in boxes, which are subject to audit in
a random manner. A fraud scheme must take into
account how to avoid detection during an audit.
One possibility is to leave some precincts unaf-
fected and to direct the audit to those precincts. The
choice of which precincts to affect can be done sys-
tematically or at random. This generates two kinds
of precincts: those that were tampered with and
those that were not. Now, if the program that se-
lects the boxes to be opened in an audit process
can be controlled, then it will be possible to select
the boxes of those precincts that were not tampered
with and this sample might seem random in all as-
pects except as to the question of fraud.
Our analysis shows that the sample selected to
carry out the audit on August 18, 2004 was not ran-
dom nor representative of all the precincts. In this
sample, the elasticity of the signatures compared to
the votes is 10 percent higher and the possibility
that this is random is significantly less than 1 per-
cent. We repeated our analysis randomly selecting
1,000 samples from un-audited precincts and this
result does not hold.
One important fact is that the CNE refused to
use the random number-generating program offered
by the Carter Center for the August 18th audit and
instead used its own program installed in its own
computer and initialed with their own seed.
In conclusion, this study rejects certain hypothe-
ses of fraud, but indicates others that are compatible
with the statistical data.
In statistics, it is impossible to confirm a hypoth-
esis, but it is possible to reject it. As Karl Popper
said when observing 1,000 white swans: this does
not prove the accuracy of the thesis that all swans
are white. Nevertheless, observing a black swan does
allow one to reject it.
Paraphrasing Popper, our white swan represents
no fraud. The results we obtain make up a black
swan. The alternate hypothesis that there was fraud
is consistent with our results, which is why we are
unable to reject it.
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